Parmenides · Plato
Clearly.
Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.
That also is clear in my judgment.
Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
Certainly.
And will not the one come into being together with each part--together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?
True.
Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.
Certainly.
After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?
I cannot answer.
But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.
Of course.
Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.
True.
And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.
No.
But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.
In what way?
Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.
And what of that?
If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than the others.
Yes.
But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?
By a smaller portion.
Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?
Yes.
And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?
Yes, younger.
And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.
Certainly.
Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.
That is clear.
Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion--in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.
Certainly.
For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.
Certainly.
But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
Of course it must.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?
Certainly.
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
True.
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?
Certainly.
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?
Impossible.
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.
True.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?
Impossible.
And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
I should.
And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
I should.
The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.
Certainly.
And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
Certainly.
And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?
Inevitably.
And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
Yes.
And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
True.
And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
How can it?
But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.
Impossible.
And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?
There cannot.
But neither can it change without changing.
True.
When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
It cannot.
And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?
What thing?
The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.
So it appears.
And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.
It will not.
And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming--then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.
Very true.
And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.
True.
All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.
Of course.
1.aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others--is not that also to be considered?
Yes.
Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than the one.
Let us do so.
Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.
Very true.
Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.
In what way?
Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.
Right.
And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?
So we say.
And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.
How do you mean?
If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of any one of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.
Clearly not.
Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all--of this the part will be a part.
Certainly.
If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.
True.
Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.
Certainly.
And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.
True.
But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the one itself can be one.
Very true.
Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.
True.
And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?
Of course.
And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.
True.
But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?
How so?
Let us look at the matter thus:--Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when they are partaking of it?
Clearly.
They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
Very true.
And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?
It must.
And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?
Certainly.
And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.
Just so.
The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.
That is clear.
Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.
Certainly.
Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.
How is that?
Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.
True.
And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.
Of course.
But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.
Yes.
And opposites are the most unlike of things.
Certainly.
Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.
That appears to be true.
Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
True.
And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?
True.
1.bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.
By all means.
Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?
Let us ask that question.
Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?
Why so?
Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.
Yes, all things.
Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?
There is nothing.
Then the one and the others are never in the same?
True.
Then they are separated from each other?
Yes.
And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?
Impossible.
Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?
Impossible.
Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?
It would seem not.
Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?
There is not.
Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.
True.
Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?
True.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.
That is clear.
But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?
Impossible.
Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.
True.
Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.
Very true.
Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.
Certainly.
2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?
Yes; we ought.
What is the meaning of the hypothesis--If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis--If the not one is not?
There is a difference, certainly.
Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions--if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?
They are entirely opposed.
And suppose a person to say:--If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?
To be sure.
And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is other than all others; we know what he means--do we not?
Yes, we do.
When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things.
Certainly.
Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known.
True.
Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?
Certainly.
Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.
Clearly so.
Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to 'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an attribute of 'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned.
True.
Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate 'that,' and in many others.
Certainly.
And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.
Certainly.
And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
Of course.
And are not things other in kind unlike?
They are unlike.
And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?
Clearly so.
Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?
That would seem to be true.
And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.
How so?
If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than one?
Quite so.
But that cannot be.
No.
Then the one must have likeness to itself?
It must.
Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?
It cannot.
But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?
Certainly not.
And things that are not equal are unequal?
True.
And they are unequal to an unequal?
Of course.
Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?
Very true.
And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
Yes.
Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?
That appears to be true.
And greatness and smallness always stand apart?
True.
Then there is always something between them?
There is.
And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?
No, it is equality which lies between them.
Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?
That is clear.
Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?
Clearly.
Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?
How so?
It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right?
Yes.
And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?
Certainly.
Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to be when it is not, but (Or, 'to remit something of existence in relation to not-being.') were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be.
Quite true.
Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being--that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being--that is the perfection of not-being.
Most true.
Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
Certainly.
Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
Clearly.
And has not-being also, if it is not?
Of course.
But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?
Impossible.
Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?
Certainly.
And change is motion--we may say that?
Yes, motion.
And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
Yes.
And therefore is and is not in the same state?
Yes.
Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?
That appears to be true.
But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?
Impossible.
Then it cannot move by changing place?
No.
Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?
It cannot.
Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?
No.
Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?
True.
But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?
Impossible.
Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?
Certainly.
Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?
That seems to be true.
But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?
Yes.
Then the one, being moved, is altered?
Yes.
And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?
No.
Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?
Right.
Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?
That is clear.
And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?
Very true.
And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?
True.
2.b. And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.
Let us do as you say.
If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.
Yes.
Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?
Just so.
And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?
Quite absolutely.
Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?
It cannot.
And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?
Nothing else.
And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?
Impossible.
The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?
True.
Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?
No.
Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?
True.
But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?
Certainly not.
Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?
Of course.
Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?
Neither.
Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?
That is clear.
And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?
No.
Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
Clearly not.
Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?
Certainly not.
And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?
They cannot.
Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?
No.
Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?
Such appears to be the conclusion.
2.aa. Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.
Yes; let us determine that.
The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them.
True.
But to speak of the others implies difference--the terms 'other' and 'different' are synonymous?
True.
Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
Yes.
Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?
Certainly.
And what can that be?--for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.
They will not.
Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.
True.
And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?
Very true.
And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?
Exactly.
And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?
True.
And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?
It can.
And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?
Yes.
And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it?
Certainly.
And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.
Yes.
And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.
How so?
Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.
Very true.
And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?
Certainly.
And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?
Nothing more certain.
Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.
They must.
Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
In what way?
Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?
True.
But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and unlike, themselves?
True.
And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.
Certainly.
And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?
Most true.
2.bb. Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.
Let us ask that question.
In the first place, the others will not be one?
Impossible.
Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.
True.
If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.
They are not.
Nor do they appear either as one or many.
Why not?
Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.
True.
Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connexion with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.
No.
Then if one is not, there is no conception of any of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.
You cannot.
Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?
It would seem not.
Nor as like or unlike?
No.
Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;--the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?
True.
Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?
Certainly.
Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.
Most true.
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Starvard